The issue of morality is perhaps the most common source of discourse among humanity. Consequently, philosophers have endlessly propounded their observations and ruminations in attempt to establish an axiomatic set which either encapsulates man’s nature in relation to morality or describes what the relation ought to be. Even before the attempt to create such a moral theory, however, a particular inquiry is necessary: is this feat possible?

It will be a noncontentious postulation, that, for any assessment of moral value, among the entire human population, living or nonliving, at the very least, there will be one objection. Does this fact establish that the theory we seek is already impossible?

The purview of the theory must be established. It will not be too great a request that a moral theory represent not every man’s behavior or belief, but rather the vast majority, such that claiming it to be veritable is unlikely to engender dissent while remaining useful.

Now, among men, it is commonly understood that there is often a significant diversity in the ascription of moral quality. This fact is evinced not only through popular discourse on topics where all relevant information is known by every party, but also via personal experiences with interpersonal dilemmas.

Again, we have discovered a significant diversity among the observable manifestations of morality in our defined purview. Have we established our desideratum as paradoxical?

An important distinction must be made. Our attempt to create a moral theory by examining the nature of humankind must not be superficial. More directly, it is absolutely possible that every man is guided by marginally different principles and processes, which may be distorted or ignored as a result of viscera.

Allow us to consider the following situation:

A man and his friend have agreed to be roommates. One of the operating conditions they agreed upon from the outset of their entanglement is that they shall wash their dishes after use. As one returns home from a trying workday, he arrives to find that his roommate has used dishes and has left them in the sink. Storming to his roommate’s room, in a fit of anger, he exclaims his roommate’s failure to comply with their agreement. He is told to “calm down,” but continues his harangue, describing himself as justified, but ultimately retiring himself to his room for the rest of the night. The following morning, he speaks to his roommate, looking away with penitence. He apologizes, explaining that such vexation and behavior was unacceptable.

This example illustrates that although a significant deviation from a common morality was observed, it was transitory, the result of a mental state—it does not exist as a judgement which our theory must explain. It may not be too reprehensible a postulation, therefore, that much of the variation in moral judgment by mankind may be extrinsic. If this is the case, we have reason to believe such a moral theory to be possible.

Another element, however, which jeopardizes the viability of our theory is the diversity of cultures. It is well understood that different cultures across the earth exhibit distinct moral tendencies. It is even better understood that the moral tendencies of humanity differ starkly across the field of time.

The opprobrious nature of historic events such as genocide and enslavement exist as testament to the vicissitudes of human morality. Surely it is impossible that there is any viable constant system of moral judgment among man if such atrocities ever occurred…

Take notice, however, to the need for justification. In those ignominious cases the parties subjected to horrors were regarded as unworthy of human rights on account of their alleged origin and behavior. The perpetrators defended their behavior through the assertion that what is not human cannot be entitled to human rights, claiming specific humans to be non-human. By imputing the state of a society to a particular group of humans, murderers cognized the suffering inflicted as deserved. None of them would assent to the idea that they are “torturing innocent humans.”

Supposing this theory to encompass most flagitious iniquities, that chronic injustices are perpetuated via the denial of human recognition or the conception of desert, an arrant moral theory is still possible.

In this inquiry, perhaps it is best that we begin here—with the right of physical freedom.

It is widely recognized that physical freedom is a notion granted to all humans. That the touching, damaging, or termination of a human’s life against its will is inherently wrong.

Two primary questions may arise from this statement: 1) What of the exceptions? and 2) Why?

An exception might be in the case of suicide. Most protest that interference with a human’s attempt of self-termination be considered evil by violation of physical freedom. In a similar light, many believe death by another which is consented to is not an acceptable exercise of physical freedom. If we wish to discover the nature of these exceptions, we must take a clear look at their common conditions.

We hold that very often those considering suicide are in a transitory state—that there is a mental illness, such as depression, which disallows them from viewing facts about their lives which make them “worth living.” As such, it is not really possible for them to consent to death, as they are under the influence of some force which clouds judgement and may lead to decisions of great importance which cannot be undone.

What if, however, this is not present? That a person experiences no mental illness yet maintains that his death is preferrable to his life? We are still not necessarily inclined to acquiesce to this agency. If his life is not marked by an incessant torture with no foreseeable end, we may resort to the happiness of others as reasoning for eschewing self-termination.

Yet what if this is not one of the suicidal’s interests? Do we suddenly allow him to commit the act? Or do we physically restrain him, though he has consented to this act upon himself? The same can be said of self-immolation, or any self-destructive activity. Physical freedom is a right only insofar as it does not destroy the self.

The reason behind this is unclear. Perhaps we believe that allowing such is extremely detrimental to society, but even so, in a scenario where it is not damaging to society, it is difficult to imagine taking no issue with self-destructive behavior. In the simplest terms however, we may explain that such behavior displeases us greatly, and because we agree on this violation of freedom, it is not immoral. Recognizing the self-destructive exceptions, we shall qualify:

Physical freedom refers to the condition of an agent in which every physical act upon him is aligned with his will as a pure agent.

Let us now consider emotional freedom.

Suppose a girl is to be given a gaming console she has sought for the past few months by her parents. Her envious younger sister throws a fit and declares she will not eat for a week if her parents do so. If the parents are aware of this promise yet reward their eldest daughter anyway, according to the foregoing doctrine, they and their actions are bad, though the suffering of the younger daughter is self-inflicted.

Therefore, we shall stipulate that the quality of volition is directly related to the excusability of actions which violate this freedom. This criterion is constructed without the aggressive phraseology of describing harm voluntary or involuntary, as this quality, like most, is bimodal; for is it voluntary or involuntary that we are offended by an insult to our parents? As we hear it, we feel a fire within us set ablaze; and yet, we may acknowledge that words of no truth are meaningless. With this, we shall qualify our definition of emotional freedom:

Emotional freedom refers to the condition of an agent in which all negative feeling can be imputed to himself as a pure agent.

Let us now consider intellectual freedom. It is widely held that actions which preclude man’s ability to investigate truths are immoral. As such:

Intellectual freedom refers to the condition in which an agent is not drawn away from truth.

The only notable exception to the claim of these freedoms is desert—specifically, that the transgression of these principles lessens a person’s right to them. It is less moral to punch a man who has hurt no one than it is to punch a man who has punched others without rationale. In the same vein, it is less moral to harangue a woman who has done nothing than it is to harangue a woman who has harassed others.

The excusability of these responses to immoral behavior are determined by the amount by which they exceed the proportion of the original action’s immorality. If a student has her notes scribbled on, a punch as retaliation is described as “too far.” What determines the accurate retaliatory response, however, varies by human perception and opinion.

In certain cases, however, a retaliation is not only completely excused but perhaps encouraged or considered moral itself. These are cases where the retaliatory action is likely to prevent the iniquity from arising again. Not only is there no immorality in the ostracization of parents who verbally abuse their child publicly, but the action is also moral.

With this, our disquisition of morality thus far has afforded us the following:

1) Exercises of freedom which significantly displease us all disallow for immorality in their appropriate recourse.

2) Violations of physical, emotional, or intellectual freedom as recourse for iniquity are less immoral when they do not exceed the appropriate response and are completely excusable when they are likely to prevent the iniquity from occurring again.

Moreover, this notion that violations are moral if they prevent further iniquity resembles a famous theory: Utility. More specifically, however, this resembles negative Utilitarianism: we have prioritized the minimization of iniquity as opposed to simply the maximization of happiness. As such:

3) Actions which are taken which violate physical, emotional, or intellectual freedoms when there is a path which violates these freedoms less are immoral. Actions which are aligned with the previous statement that decrease the violation of physical, emotional, or intellectual freedoms or increase pleasure are moral.

While this maxim appears to hold generally, we may recognize that the suffering of an individual is acceptable if it engenders for him a pleasure of higher magnitude as a sidenote. For this it does not matter whether the individual will suffer in the future, which would put the situation under the actual principle—we find it excusable to perform such an act if the individual will already be happy or neutral in this regard permanently.

So far, this disquisition has lent itself primarily to the discussion of consequentialism; whether actions themselves are good, or bad, but we have not answered what makes man good or bad.

Let us conceive of thoughts. While internal, notions and opinions which implicate an insouciance for freedom or are invidious without vindication are regarded as the ‘thoughts of a bad person.’ Before we predicate our tenet, however, let us consider this situation:

Suppose a man go about his private life while another man watches him do so. In this situation, no suffering is imparted. Yet, for many, the stalker has violated the privacy of the man, an act morally inexcusable.

What shall we extract from this? If the man who was stalked was aware of the stalking, similar to how he would be if people thought poorly of him, his emotional freedom would be violated. This appears to be wholly divorced from our foregoing axioms—even without intent or ability to violate freedoms these beliefs are immoral in terms of character only. As such, we shall declare:

4) Thoughts or actions which would be immoral according to 3) if the subject were aware of them are characteristically immoral.

We shall now explore the more fraught aspects of morality.

Let a teacher distribute confectionaries to half of the students in his class. He does so individually, such that each student believes all have been afforded the same rewards. Having enough to provide for all students, has the teacher been immoral?

This act of discrimination did not violate any of our foregoing tenets or engender a negative outcome for any student who did not receive a confection—yet it seems this action is not excusable, even if by little.

What can we extract from this dilemma? Though initially challenging, recognize that all students were equally deserving of the confectionaries making discrimination unjust. Consequently, we may imagine the principle to be that:

5) To act such that man is not culpable for his actions which translate into rewards, punishments, and responsibilities as the image of desert is immoral.

We shall now consider the nature of exploitation.

Let a group of men be addicted to substances. There are many people who sell these substances. These vendors will not soon depart or desist. A man, aware of these circumstances, appends himself to the list of vendors. In this action, he begins to acquire capital, without changing the number of men who are addicted to the substances or their suffering. Is such an action excusable?

The only change which can be observed is that the man gains money, and the other vendors lose their share of the market, as we have stipulated it to be zero-sum. To discover the true nature of our sentiments toward exploitation, we shall assume that in this situation, by this change, there is less suffering (the new vendor was poor, and now he now within his needs, and the other vendors were beyond their needs).

If the new vendor had other viable methods of work, we would likely concur that his actions are immoral even though they had no ill effects. If he did not, however, we will likely concur that his actions are excusable, though perhaps repulsive. From this we will extract:

6) Actions which do not minimize suffering and use preexisting iniquity are immoral. Actions which minimize suffering through the use of preexisting iniquity are characteristically immoral when they are believed or suspected to do so and other options which do not use the iniquity which meet this minimization are available.

We shall now consider the nature of compulsions.

Let a man have an infection. Another man near him possesses ample penicillin for which he has no immediate or foreseeable use. The man with the penicillin is aware of the other’s infection but does not give him any penicillin.

Though there may be a tension caused by the sentiment of physical freedom, we will find a general consensus that this behavior is immoral. We may express this as:

7) Any person who believes or suspects that he may take an action such that the privation of 5) is minimized and the difference between his privation or possession of 5) and the privation of 5) of another is significant but does not enact or investigate the action has committed an immoral act.

Now, it may be asked, what is the relationship between moral character and material actions? Let us investigate:

Let a man yell at his son. If the father is angry in this action, he is abusive and unable to regulate his emotions. Let the father not be angry. Now his abuse is not marked by a mental state which must be regulated—his abuse is emblematic of his character whole and worse.

Let a woman donate millions to charity anonymously and surreptitiously. Her actions had positive effects, and she gained virtually nothing by the transfer. Yet let her do so publicly, thinking to herself that she only does so for the recognition. Her actions have still had positive effects, yet her character took no interest in doing good; her action is not truly good.

Let a man provide popsicles for the neighborhood’s children. If the popsicles please the children and parents, then the man is good by action and character. If he made them from scratch, then his character is even better. But if the popsicles contained an ingredient which upset the stomachs of the children, the action is no longer good. If he did not know, he is still good. If he did know, he is immoral. If he was not certain but had the suspicion that the ingredient may upset their stomachs, he is immoral. If the ingredient did not cause issues yet the man believed they would or suspected them to, his actions are good, yet he is characteristically immoral.

Let any man commit an action effectively and characteristically immoral. When many years pass, this choice is adduced in the estimation of his character, and yet, there is a hesitancy: he may have changed.

Through this we may observe that true morality is an instantaneous quality of an agent—actions are merely the method by which we observe them, and as such, compute their weight in the estimation of overall character with respect to time. We may interpret our judgements as such:

The critical moral character of an agent is estimated by the temporal sum of his beliefs, thoughts, and actions as he conceived them to associated with morality or immorality along with how he conceived them to affect his interests and the effort by which they were performed.

With this, we have so far identified three levels of morality:

Material morality, or those actions which produce effects upon others;

characteristic morality, or those beliefs as they relate to reality;

and critical moral character, the transcendent state of the mind, whose beliefs, actions, and intents exist as functions of itself and cognition (knowledge, reasoning ability, etc.).

To draw out the contradistinction between the last and the previous:

Suppose a man walk on his way home. He encounters a man, and in this moment, is filled with hatred. He kills the man. Certainly, this is immoral on all three fronts.

Yet what if the man had not been there? Our evildoer is certainly evil with that capacity, if only the existence of the other man was necessary for murder. Yet, material and characteristic immorality were unfulfilled. Instead, it is only the critical moral character which is evil here.

Another illustration of the critical moral character may be an epistemological one. If a man suffers from delusions and punches another man believing he had punched him, he has violated Justice and Utility, since the other man had done nothing to deserve the action. Yet, he is not critically immoral, because he was under the belief that the other man had deserved the action. According to his sensible faculties, he has instituted the same moral values to which all subscribe.

This sort of distinction, between material, characteristic, and critical, inspires many to ask: for which is there a preponderance? To describe a person as good, which of the three shall we look toward cardinally?

It is difficult to say. Intuitively, it seems that criticality is cardinal. Quotidianly, however, we only see the consequences of actions, and are likely to give into suspicion, effectively considering consequences of a greater weight.

Our disquisition has now afforded us the following:

Exercises of freedom which significantly displease us all disallow for immorality in their appropriate recourse.
Violations of physical, emotional, or intellectual freedom as recourse for iniquity are less immoral when they do not exceed the appropriate response and are completely excusable when they are likely to prevent the iniquity from occurring again.
Actions which are taken which violate physical, emotional, or intellectual freedoms when there is a path which violates these freedoms less are immoral. Actions which are aligned with the previous statement that decrease the violation of physical, emotional, or intellectual freedoms or increase pleasure are moral.
Thoughts or actions which would be immoral according to 3) if the subject were aware of them are characteristically immoral.
To act such that man is not culpable for his actions which translate into rewards, punishments, and responsibilities as the image of desert is immoral.
Actions which do not minimize violation of 3) and use preexisting iniquity are critically immoral. Actions which minimize violations of 3) through the use of preexisting iniquity are critically immoral when they are believed or suspected to do so if other options which do not use the iniquity which meet this minimization are available.
Any person who believes or suspects that he may take an action such that the privation of 5) is minimized and the difference between his privation or possession of 5) and the privation of 5) of another is significant but does not enact or investigate the action has committed an immoral act.

In a more sensible order:

Actions which are taken which violate physical, emotional, or intellectual freedoms when there is a path which violates these freedoms less are immoral. Actions which are aligned with the previous statement that decrease the violation of physical, emotional, or intellectual freedoms or increase pleasure are moral.
Violations of physical, emotional, or intellectual freedom as recourse for iniquity are less immoral when they do not exceed the appropriate response and are completely excusable when they are likely to prevent the iniquity from occurring again.
Thoughts or actions which would be immoral according to 3) if the subject were aware of them are characteristically immoral.
To act such that man is not culpable for his actions which translate into rewards, punishments, and responsibilities as the image of desert is immoral.
Actions which do not minimize violation of 1) and use preexisting iniquity are critically immoral. Actions which minimize violations of 1) through the use of preexisting iniquity are critically immoral when they are believed or suspected to do so if other options which do not use the iniquity which meet this minimization are available.
Any person who believes or suspects that he may take an action such that the privation of 4) is minimized and the difference between his privation or possession of 4) and the privation of 4) of another is significant but does not enact or investigate the action has committed an immoral act.
Exercises of freedom which significantly displease us all disallow for immorality in their appropriate recourse.

or

Freedom
Utility
Respect
Justice
Exploitation
Compulsion
Disgust

Before we continue, let us verify that our list does not contain any normative combinations—that is, no principle is a rephrase of the another.

In Freedom, when questioned on the motives behind this principle, we may explain that it is a result of inherent human value; humans deserve freedom until they violate that of others.

This line of reasoning resembles 4). That man ought only to receive punishments, rewards, and responsibilities as the image of desert.

There is a similar case with Respect. The only difference is that it is a characteristic evil as opposed to a material one.

Adjusting our definition of Justice and reducing the size of our list disadvantages us only in that Justice as a variable is more complex. If we take notice to this complexity, however, there appears to be no issue. As such:

To act or think such that man is not culpable for his actions which translate into rewards, punishments, and responsibilities as the image of desert is immoral.
Violations of 1) as recourse for iniquity are completely excusable when they are likely to prevent the iniquity from occurring again and as aligned with 1) as possible. Actions which are aligned with the previous statement which decrease decrease violations of 1) or increase pleasure are moral.
Actions which do not minimize violation of 1) and use preexisting iniquity are characteristically immoral. Actions which minimize violations of 1) through the use of preexisting iniquity are characteristically immoral when they are believed or suspected to do so if other options which do not use the iniquity which meet this minimization are available.
Any person who believes or suspects that he may take an action such that the privation of 2) is minimized and the difference between his privation or possession of 2) and the privation of 2) of another is significant but does not enact or investigate the action has committed an immoral act.
Exercises of freedom which significantly displease us all disallow for immorality in their appropriate recourse.

or

Justice
Utility
Exploitation
Compulsion
Disgust

These five tenets concerning the common human morality have provided us the dimensions for moral space. We have also discovered:

The critical moral character of an agent is estimated by the temporal sum of his beliefs, thoughts, and actions as he conceived them to associated with morality or immorality along with how he conceived them to affect his interests and the effort by which they were performed.

Considering morality a system, we must also identify the weights of particular variables. For example:

There is the famous hypothetical of a doctor with six patients: it is possible for him to save the life of five by harvesting the organs of one who is healthy.

Even assuming that the condition of those near death is by no fault of their own nor likely to recrudesce, only intense Utilitarians will support the theoretical violation of autonomy to minimize death and the suffering of families.

If we instead let a ridiculous proposition, perhaps the life of one for a million, or a day of a man’s happiness for the termination of hunger as it is known, we easily prefer what is much larger. By this, we may intuitively infer, as a sentiment, that:

Freedom is preferrable to Utility unless the scale which holds them is greatly upset.

We may also imagine individuals who conceive of Respect and Exploitation as of no concern, holding their weight at zero, reasoning that there is no material harm.

Through the lens of this system, our disquisitions concerning morality typically have two aims:

a) to prove an inconsistency in these variables or their coefficients in some person’s system, or

b) to change these variables to be more similar to our own, typically by shame or pathos.

These variables refer to the foregoing five tenets, their coefficients, and also equivocal terms in the foregoing theory (desert, suspicion, volition, significance, and investigation), which may all be considered the variables of interest in their own systems defined by previous judgements.

Now that we have constructed a theory to explain human morality, we shall consider conundrums to verify that it is complete.

Let a man find another who is stuck and in need of assistance. The abled man begins to assist the other man, but as he does so, loses interest and desists his aid.

What we have observed appears to have violated none of our original principles—no action was taken which increased the suffering of the man trapped.

This, however, is false. An action which satisfies the condition indeed was taken: the termination of the assistance. Though it may not appeal to the typical notion of an action, it was a deliberate choice, as the body autonomically continued it, especially with the gravity of the situation.

Let a man urinates on a grave when a restroom is nearby, without the intention or ability to ruin the experience of other visitors with acridity, or attempting to disturb the nearby specters, man will likely agree that his action is wrong. And yet, no living person was hurt, nor did this agent attempt to do such.

This conundrum conforms to our system when we recognize the grave as a posthumous extension of physicality and thus physical freedom.

Let a man claim his economic struggle is similar to that of enslaved people, though he is employed with legal protections.

The man has claimed his struggle is much higher than it is and intimates that he is worthy of some pity or indemnification commensurate with this claimed struggle, a belief which is incompatible with the first tenet because he does not deserve it. It is therefore characteristically (and critically) immoral.

Let a famous author create indecorously priced clothing, claiming it to be for her votaries. Presuming that the clothing may have been priced lower without loss, how might the theoretical obloquy she receives be explained by the foregoing theory?

The creation of a product whose price is unreasonable (that is, characterized by avarice) when marketed to any person who is a fanatic utilizes parasocial features to increase the probability of a purchase which is inadvisable—simply, the use of fanaticism to limit consent and thus encroach on the Freedom in Justice.

Furthermore, the creation of a product whose price is unreasonable in the name of supporters implicates a lack of regard or complete insouciance of the human value of fans or their contributions—simply, people who must be regarded highly according to desert are not, or perhaps seen only as lucrative, thus deviating from the systems of desert within Justice.

Now, what has this disquisition afforded us? We now possess the principles which govern our ethical judgements along with the method by which we judge humanity. With this, we may consider moral dilemmas which are typically turgid as they relate to the foregoing fundamental elements of other judgements, and thus discover what decision must be made on the current issue to remain consistent with our preexisting judgements.

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